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Monetary policy and financial 
integration: the case of Chile
1 
Rodrigo Cifuentes and Jorge Desormeaux 
I. Introduction 
In Chile, monetary policy and financial openness have experienced important changes in the last 
30  years. Starting in the mid-1970s, a first attempt to liberalise financial markets and the capital 
account ended in a major financial crisis in 1982, due to inadequate prudential regulation and 
supervision. This reflects the fact that financial integration can make a major contribution to economic 
development, but also entails risks. On the one hand, free mobility of capital across borders allows the 
financing of investment at a lower cost and thus has a positive effect on output. Capital flows also 
facilitate the transfer of new technologies, ease access to foreign export markets, increase 
competitiveness and develop domestic capital markets. They can also facilitate portfolio diversification 
and consumption smoothing. On the other hand, an open capital account can increase local 
vulnerability and exposure to external shocks, as Chile experienced in 1982. Other well-known 
examples of risks related to open capital accounts include those derived from overheating, asset price 
bubbles or excessive risk taking in the financial and corporate sectors. Since capital flows are highly 
volatile, the recipient country may also become more exposed to contagion and the herding behaviour 
of international investors. 
To enjoy the advantages of financial integration, the Chilean economy completely opened the capital 
account in 2001. But before reaching this stage, the country built strong institutions to deal with the 
associated risks. Today the Chilean economy is much better prepared than in the past to deal with the 
challenges of financial openness. This has been thoroughly recognised by international financial 
markets, and demonstrated by its response to “real life” stress tests, such as the crises in other 
economies in the region, and the world economic slowdown of 2001-03. 
The institutional cornerstones of Chile’s current macroeconomic stability include a monetary regime 
based on inflation targeting, a fiscal policy based on a structural budget surplus rule, and a floating 
exchange rate regime. Financial stability is supported by credible institutions and effective regulations, 
which include technical supervisory bodies devoted to specific financial and capital-market segments. 
This paper describes the policy frameworks and institutions adopted in Chile to reap the benefits of 
financial integration at minimum risk. In addition, it provides econometric and other quantitative 
evidence of the extent of such integration and some of its characteristics. Section II provides a 
historical perspective and reviews the key elements of Chile’s macroeconomic policy framework: 
monetary policy based on central bank independence and inflation targeting, a floating exchange rate 
regime, and coordination of monetary policy with a rules-based fiscal policy. Section III explains the 
long-term process involved in the opening of the capital account and its relation with other policies and 
institutions. Section IV gives an empirical analysis of financial integration in Chile and assesses its 
extent and evolution over time. Section V provides concluding remarks. 
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II.  Monetary policy framework and institutions 
II.1  A historical perspective 
Monetary policy and financial integration have experienced important changes over the course of the 
20th century in Chile. Until 1931, the Chilean economy was fully integrated into the world economy, 
and monetary policy was subordinated to the balance of payments, as befitted the Gold Standard. 
After the 1930s, free trade was replaced by import substitution, capital movements were severely 
restricted, and access to international capital markets disappeared. Financial repression became the 
norm, and monetary policy was passively subordinated to fiscal policy. As a result, inflation became 
high and persistent, in a period when the developed world experienced very low inflation, as a 
by-product of the Bretton Woods arrangement. 
Important reforms took place in the second half of the 1970s, as a new administration drastically 
reduced the fiscal deficit, liberalised capital markets, and opened the economy to foreign trade. 
Monetary policy was no longer subordinated to fiscal policy, but to the balance of payments, while the 
exchange rate followed a crawling peg. In that framework monetary policy lacked a nominal anchor. 
Therefore, in 1979, the Central Bank of Chile (CBCh) pegged the exchange rate to the US dollar, 
providing a nominal anchor for monetary policy. The fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned in 
June 1982 as a result of a major financial crisis which was triggered by a large shift in US monetary 
policy and inadequate prudential regulation and supervision at home. Subsequently (until the end of 
the decade), monetary policy was subordinated to the resolution of the financial crisis. In August 1984 
the exchange rate was allowed to float within a narrow band, in an environment of tight capital 
controls. This allowed the CBCh some room to follow an active monetary policy in 1985. However, 
monetary policy could not operate as an effective counter-cyclical tool until the following decade, due 
to the significant external constraint created by the debt crisis. As a result, balance of payments 
considerations prevailed over other policy goals, such as inflation or output stabilisation. 
In December 1989, in a landmark decision, new Central Bank legislation was enacted which 
established a significant degree of independence for monetary policy. 
II.2  Monetary policy under inflation targeting 
Of all the possible monetary regimes available at the time, the newly independent Central Bank opted 
in 1990 for inflation targeting (IT), becoming the second country to adopt such a framework after the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1989. The first annual target was established in September 1990 for 
the following year. Subsequently, Chile successfully reduced inflation down from a peak of 30% year-
on-year in September 1990 to single digit rates in less than a decade (see Graph 1). The IT framework 
was fully implemented in 2000, when the CBCh formally adopted this approach to monetary policy, 
established procedures for regular monetary policy meetings, forecasting tools and models, and began 
publishing periodic inflation reports including explicit inflation forecasts. Previously, in September 
1999, the CBCh had adopted a floating exchange rate regime, which strengthened its anchor and its 
own management of monetary policy. 
Since 2001, Chile’s inflation target has been defined as a 2% to 4% target range, centred around 3% 
annual inflation. The headline CPI is used as the inflation target measure over a 24-month policy 
horizon, based on an estimate of how long it takes for monetary policy changes to affect inflation. 
Monetary policy responds to deviations of the CBCh’s inflation forecast (and the gap between actual 
and potential output) from the 3% inflation target over the 24-month policy horizon. While the ultimate 
goal is to achieve the inflation target, policy focuses on inflation forecasts. This regime is sometimes 
called “inflation-forecast” targeting. 
The CBCh’s operational target is the overnight interest rate on interbank loans. Monetary policy 
instruments include open-market operations (OMOs), standing facilities and legal bank reserves. 
OMOs are the main instrument for managing liquidity according to an operational target level 
determined by the Central Bank Board. They take the form of twice-weekly auctions of Central Bank 
securities, maturing in up to one year. Liquidity management is fine-tuned by complementary 
repurchase and reverse-repurchase operations. Standing facilities are credit lines that provide liquidity 
at higher interest rates, to discourage their use at normal times. Reserve requirements on bank 
deposits are not used as a monetary policy instrument and in fact have remained unchanged since 
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Graph 1 
Inflation targets and inflation rates 1990-2005 
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The Central Bank believes that transparency and accountability should be central features of monetary 
policy and has acted accordingly. The monthly schedule of monetary policy meetings is announced in 
advance and a press release and minutes are published shortly after each meeting. The Monetary 
Policy Report, which is published every four months, is widely circulated by Board members and 
managers. The Bank’s macroeconomic projections model, statistical data, and policy and research 
papers are published regularly on paper and also on the Bank’s website. By law, the Central Bank is 
accountable to the Chilean Senate. After every Report’s release, the Central Bank Governor and 
Board present the analyses and projections therein to the Senate. 
Monetary policy can contribute to output stabilisation, as long as this is consistent with its primary 
objective of meeting the inflation target. This occurs when demand shocks dominate supply shocks, 
ie when output (or the output gap) is positively correlated with inflation. Under such circumstances the 
Central Bank contributes actively to stabilising both inflation and output, applying a counter-cyclical 
monetary policy. Since 2002 the counter-cyclical stance of monetary policy has been reinforced, as 
reflected by an increasingly expansionary monetary policy in response to the combination of below-
target actual inflation and lower than potential actual output. 
Monetary policy does not deal with volatile capital flows directly. However, when changes in their level 
or volatility affect other macroeconomic variables, and ultimately economic activity and inflation, then 
monetary policy reacts, and can have an effect on capital flows. This procedure is consistent with the 
Central Bank’s mandate and contributes to more effective monetary policy management in Chile. 
II.3  The floating exchange rate regime 
As discussed above, the Central Bank complemented its inflation targeting regime with a floating 
exchange rate regime. This was implemented in September 1999, at the same time that the 
IT framework was consolidated, and when the Board of the CBCh estimated that mechanisms for 
dealing with external shocks had been enhanced. This topic is discussed in Section III. 
Considering Chile’s floating exchange rate regime and rising creditworthiness in international capital 
markets, the need for holding large amounts of international reserves has been reduced. On the other 
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of carrying reserves. In this context, the CBCh is implementing a programme to redeem part of its 
dollar-linked debt with international reserves, which is expected to reduce its current level of reserves. 
Nevertheless, the Central Bank will continue to maintain a significant level of international reserves for 
two reasons: one, because reserves contribute to reducing the country risk premium and act as a 
buffer against possible liquidity shocks; and two, because reserves allow monetary authorities to 
intervene credibly in the exchange market under exceptional circumstances. 
Like most other central banks, the CBCh can conduct sterilised foreign exchange interventions to 
counteract excessive volatility. The Bank acted decisively to avoid the negative consequences of the 
exchange rate overreacting to shocks. Acknowledging the difficulties involved in identifying “excessive” 
exchange rate shocks, the Central Bank’s interventions are not so much aimed at maintaining a 
particular exchange rate level, but rather at avoiding major exchange rate volatility. 
Since the flexible exchange rate regime was introduced in 1999, the Central Bank has considered on 
two occasions that exchange rate depreciations were large enough to warrant its intervention in the 
market. In both cases, the CBCh pre-announced the time horizon for its sterilised intervention (August-
December 2001 and October 2002-February 2003), as well as the total amount of resources that 
would be used and the form of the intervention.
2 However, specific amounts and dates of each 
intervention were not provided in advance. An empirical evaluation of the specific interventions 
implemented during these periods suggests that their effects on the spot market were slight and in 
most cases negligible. However, the evidence also shows that the announcements themselves 
affected the spot exchange rate significantly; ie the impact of Central Bank actions at the level of the 
exchange rate arose mainly from the authorities’ public announcement.
3 
The current exchange rate regime provides indirect mechanisms to deal with volatile capital flows. In 
the first place, since the exchange rate fluctuates according to market conditions, possible gains from 
betting against the authorities are not present, thereby eliminating a potential source of capital flow 
volatility (speculation against the currency and the currency regime). In this sense, a flexible exchange 
regime provides an effective buffer against this source of volatile capital flows. Second, the CBCh 
maintains significant international reserves. Hence the monetary authority has the means to act 
against any excessive (temporary) exchange rate depreciation and volatility, in the event of a large 
liquidity shock. 
The floating exchange rate mechanism was complemented in 2000 by regulations on currency risk of 
banks and, indirectly, of corporations. The Central Bank and the Superintendency of Banks 
established rules that limit currency mismatches of banks and that require them to consider the 
exposure to currency risk of their clients when assessing their creditworthiness. Thus, currency 
mismatches in companies translate into higher capital requirements for those banks that lend to them. 
This policy has significantly increased the resilience of the banking and corporate sector to exchange 
rate shocks. 
II.4  Monetary and fiscal policy coordination 
The policy framework adopted by the Central Bank is complemented and supported by a responsible 
and sound fiscal stance. In fact, the Ministry of Finance has adopted a structural surplus rule. This rule 
- quite exceptional in the world - defines a resource envelope for fiscal policy, determined as an annual 
structural budget surplus
4 equivalent to 1% of GDP. The difference between the structural and the 
actual budget surplus is determined by the deviation from trend levels of GDP and the price of copper, 
weighted by their impact on government revenue. Accordingly, the government recorded actual 
deficits during 2000-03 and is expected to record a budget surplus in 2004, thus satisfying the 
1%-of-GDP structural surplus rule since its inception. 
Fiscal policy therefore plays a significant counter-cyclical role, thus complementing the CBCh’s 
counter-cyclical policy framework. Counter-cyclical or stabilising policies are only feasible when 
                                                       
2  On both occasions the Central Bank announced that it would intervene both directly in the spot market and through swaps 
between domestic currency- and foreign currency-denominated bonds issued by the Bank. 
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macroeconomic institutions are strong and policy rules are credible. Recent international evidence 
shows that countries with low risk premia on their sovereign liabilities are more likely to adopt counter-
cyclical policies.
5 Among these, Chile, with a country risk premium currently below 100 basis points, 
has applied some of the strongest counter-cyclical policies among emerging economies, contributing 
more effectively to stabilising output. 
Institutionalisation of policy rules by both the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank has simplified 
policy coordination. The Chilean experience illustrates that, in the presence of strong institutions and 
policy rules, policies can be coordinated by design, and there is less conflict over the best response to 
any given shock that affects the economy. 
III.  Capital account liberalisation and institution building 
Historically, Chile has had capital account restrictions through most of the 20th century, starting in a 
context of high inflation and State intervention in the early 1930s. During the second half of the 1970s, 
the country started to open up its capital account, following a trade liberalisation programme initiated in 
1974. The opening up of the capital account was implemented in the context of a fixed exchange rate 
regime, widespread indexation and a financial sector that lacked the required prudential regulation and 
supervision. Despite the official position, market agents tended to operate under the assumption that 
the government somehow backed the soundness and creditworthiness of local financial institutions 
and insured the deposit base. This set the stage for an explosion of moral hazard problems, which 
were facilitated by capital inflows. Due to inadequate regulation and supervision, levels of 
indebtedness, maturity gaps between assets and liabilities, related-lending, and foreign currency 
mismatches received less attention than they deserved. 
Weak institutions and macro-fundamentals added up to a fragile economic policy framework, leaving 
the economy vulnerable. When the 1981 international recession hit with unexpected severity, it 
abruptly ended efforts to open up the capital account, given the sudden stop of capital flows to 
developing countries. The deep financial crisis that ensued led to a rapid drain on international 
reserves, and the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned. The devaluation that followed 
provoked severe losses across all sectors of the economy. 
In the aftermath of the debt crisis, in the mid-1980s, the authorities focused on economic recovery and 
reorganised the overall macro-financial framework. Drawing on the recession experience and the 
subsequent financial crisis, a new banking law was enacted in 1986 that addressed moral hazard and 
systemic risk issues, and regulations governing financial institutions were upgraded to strengthen the 
financial sector. 
In the early 1990s several factors - including a successful transition to democracy - favoured the 
voluntary return of capital flows to Chile. Given the macroeconomic policy framework, the authorities 
faced a classical monetary policy dilemma, with more policy goals than independent instruments. The 
level of domestic interest rates necessary to control aggregate demand gave rise to incentives for 
interest-arbitrage capital inflows, within a broader context of a sharp increase in capital flows to most 
emerging economies. The choice was either to accept an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
inconsistent with external balance, or to reduce interest rates, in which case the risks of exchange rate 
appreciation would remain small, but inflationary risks would dominate the picture in a highly indexed 
economy. 
The policy options available included allowing the exchange rate to appreciate, limiting appreciation 
through sterilised intervention accompanied by tight fiscal policy to offset the associated costs, or 
introducing controls on capital inflows, and at the same time liberalising capital outflows. Chile’s 
strategy involved a combination of all these options. 
In terms of capital outflows, the opening of the capital account went ahead relatively quickly. In 1991, 
the procedures for direct investment abroad were streamlined, and banks could invest abroad up to 
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40% of their foreign currency deposits. In 1992, the limit on banks’ foreign exchange holdings doubled 
and export proceeds exempt from surrender requirements were increased. In 1994, restrictions on 
profit remittances were lifted, banks were allowed to invest up to 20% of their capital and reserves 
abroad, and the ceilings on institutional investors’ investment abroad were raised. In 1995, the 
minimum holding period for foreign direct investment in Chile was reduced from three years to one. In 
1998, the ceiling for banks’ investment in assets denominated in foreign currency was raised to 70% of 
their capital and reserves, and the ceiling for mutual funds was eliminated. Ceilings on investment 
abroad were also increased for pension funds and life and general insurance companies. All these 
measures contributed to an increase in Chile’s degree of international financial integration. 
With regard to capital inflows, a more gradual approach was followed during the transition to price 
stability, as independence of monetary policy in a context of limited exchange variability depended on 
some degree of capital controls. Thus, an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) was introduced 
in June 1991, in response to a surge in capital flows. Other important controls were a minimum holding 
period for portfolio investments and stringent requirements for issuing bonds and American depositary 
receipts (ADRs) abroad. 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the URR was expected to enhance the autonomy of monetary 
policy and simultaneously minimise the effects on the exchange rate of the tight monetary policy 
needed to control aggregate demand. From a macro-prudential point of view, the URR was expected 
to discourage short-term capital inflows without affecting long-term foreign investment, especially 
foreign direct investment. This was expected to reduce the volatility of international capital flows into 
the country and, subsequently, exchange rate volatility. 
The URR remained in effect during most of the 1990s and in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. But in 
late June 1998, in light of strong pressure against the peso, the Central Bank cut the URR from 30% to 
10%, and then to zero in September of that year, although it remained as part of the CBCh 
regulations. 
Overall, several studies suggest that the URR had the following effects on the Chilean economy 
(Valdés and Soto (1998), Edwards (1998, 2000), De Gregorio et al (2000), Gallego et al (1999), 
Gallego and Hernández (2002)): 
(a)  It created a wedge between domestic and external interest rates, allowing monetary policy 
more independence; 
(b)  It modified the composition of capital flows, raising the share of medium- and long-erm 
inflows; 
(c)  It did not, however, affect the real exchange rate or the overall size of capital inflows; 
(d)  It discriminated against small and medium-sized companies, as the cost of the URR weighed 
more heavily on small businesses, which faced stricter financial restrictions and higher 
financing costs; 
(e)  Loopholes had to be constantly plugged, as private agents had a substantial incentive to 
elude the regulation; 
(f)  It produced some distortions in capital versus labour costs, redistributing income in favour of 
the owners of capital, and distorting resource allocations somewhat. 
At the regulatory level, the URR was finally removed in April 2001, as part of several measures applied 
to increase Chile’s financial integration with the rest of the world. 
Achieving the medium-term objective of completely opening up the capital account was possible once 
the authorities considered fundamentals and institutions to be strong enough to shield the economy 
from external shocks, and thus able to give Chile the full benefit of a higher degree of financial 
integration. These conditions included: 
(a)  Adoption of a floating exchange rate regime within an inflation targeting framework; 
(b) Price  stability; 
(c)  Prudential regulation and supervision of the financial sector, including regulations on 
currency mismatches; 
(d)  Development of markets for derivative instruments to provide better coverage of exchange 
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(e)  A suitable level of international reserves; 
(f)  A more diversified trade structure; 
(g)  A solvent financial system; and 
(h)  A solid and prudent fiscal position, characterised by a fiscal rule targeting a structural surplus 
of 1% of GDP. 
Once these preconditions were met, Chile moved on to its current stance, and has had a fully open 
capital account regime since 2001. The only foreign exchange regulations that remain specify 
reporting requirements for statistical purposes. 
IV.  Financial market integration and domestic markets and institutions 
In this section we look at concrete measures of financial integration in the Chilean economy in order to 
assess its extent and evolution during the 1990s. We first analyse the case of stock and fixed income 
instruments, by correlating the returns in local and US markets. Then we analyse the access of local 
companies to external funding. In particular, we are interested in determining whether foreign control 
has increased local companies’ access to international capital markets, thus facilitating financial 
integration. 
IV.1 Financial  integration and domestic markets 
A similar framework is used for both stock and fixed income instruments, comparing daily returns (in 
US dollar terms) during the 1990s. In order to capture the evolution of financial integration over time, 
two-year moving windows were used in the estimation process. 
IV.1.1 Stock  markets 
Daily returns of the local market index (IPSA) were compared with those from the Dow Jones and 
Nasdaq indexes between 1989 and 2003, using a two-year moving window (see Graph 2). 
Graph 2 
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Since the data series are stationary, we can estimate the following equation on returns: 
dlog(IPSA/e) = c + α·dlog(DowJones) + β·dlog((IPSA/e)(–1)) (1) 
where the log differences correspond to the returns of the series. The coefficient α measures the 
degree of correlation between the IPSA and Dow Jones returns. The coefficient β, in turn, captures the 
importance of returns in the previous period in explaining today’s return. If there is a contemporaneous 
correlation between IPSA and Dow Jones, then the lag of only one of them suffices to capture serial 
correlation. Finally, e is the peso/dollar exchange rate. As mentioned, a two-year moving window was 
estimated for the period, meaning that we have about 500 estimates for each of the parameters. 
Table 1 shows the average of the estimates for both the Dow Jones and Nasdaq equations. 
 
Table 1 
Average of the estimates of daily IPSA returns 
in US dollars 
Explanatory 
variable  c  Return in the 
foreign market  IPSA e(–1) R
2 
Dow  Jones  0.0  0.25 0.15 0.08 
Nasdaq  0.0  0.20 0.16 0.08 
 
The lagged variable is always significant. The explanatory power of the equations, as measured by 
their R
2, is low as is usual with this type of estimation. The significance of the return in the foreign 
market varies over time. Graph 3 shows this evolution for the Dow Jones returns. 
Graph 3 shows the value of the coefficient on the left-hand axis and the significance on the right-hand 
one. A band between the values –2 and 2 on the right-hand axis shows the area where the t-statistic 
indicates that the estimate is not significantly different from zero. The horizontal axis indicates the last 
date included in the window estimation period. 
Graph 3 
Correlation of daily returns between IPSA and Dow Jones 
 
Correlation between the local and foreign stock market becomes significant by mid-1994, with 
significance becoming stronger as we move forward through the sample. This indicates that financial 
integration at the level of stock markets became a significant phenomenon by mid-1992. Significance 
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The value of the estimated parameter α fluctuates between 0.1 and 0.5 in the case of the Dow Jones 
and 0.05 and 0.4 in the case of the Nasdaq. Estimates of α show two peaks (during 1995 and from 
mid-1998 to mid-2000). These correspond to episodes of strong co-movements across markets that 
are captured by the moving window. The second peak, for example, corresponds to the sharp fall in 
foreign markets of October 1998, which was replicated in the local market. 
The impact of increased integration on market volatility is ambiguous in theory. On the one hand, the 
larger investor base can help to reduce the effect of local shocks. On the other, external shocks are 
more easily transmitted to the local market. Graph 4 shows the standard deviation and average of a 
two-year window of daily returns, measured on the left- and right-hand side, respectively. In the early 
1990s, where we found that integration was low, our measure of volatility is the highest of the whole 
sample. Volatility shows a general declining trend, except for the specific episodes already mentioned, 
where volatility rose temporarily. 
Graph 4 
Daily IPSA yield: mean and variance 
 
Thus, we conclude that financial integration increased at the stock market level during the 1990s, 
while volatility seems to have declined with market integration. 
IV.1.2 Interest  rates 
In the case of correlations in interest rates we looked at the evidence of money markets and the 
market for long-term bonds (see Graphs 5 and 6). The first is the market targeted by monetary policy 
and will be our test of monetary independence. The longer-term market will give us a better idea of 
financial integration, since it is less influenced by monetary policy. 
Regarding the money market, we compared the US three-month deposit rate with the domestic 90-day 
indexed deposit rate, using two-year moving windows. After July 2001, when the CBCh started 
targeting nominal interest rates, we compared nominal rates over six-month moving windows. 
We find that the coefficient that captures the partial correlation between domestic and foreign rates is 
not significant in all specifications. This evidence points towards independence of monetary policy 
throughout the period. 
In the case of the long-term market we compared the rates on a five-year US Treasury bond with 
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Graph 5 




Long-term internal and external interest rates 
Daily data 
 
We used daily data for domestic and foreign rates and six-month and two-year moving windows to 
evaluate the evidence. The estimated correlation coefficient is not significant for most of the sample 
(see Graph 7), except for the estimates that cover 1998. During that year, the monetary authorities 
reacted to pressure on the exchange rate by significantly increasing domestic interest rates. The 
CBCh moved to a free float regime in September 1999. Since that period, we observe a higher 
association between internal and external long-term rates, as Graph 6 shows. Correlation estimates 
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evolution of these interest rates may be the result of similar real shocks that affected both economies 
in this period, which generated similar market responses. 
Graph 7 
Correlation between domestic and foreign long-term rates 
 
We also ran a separate estimation for the period after September 2002, using the new five-year 
Central Bank bullet bond. This instrument is more comparable to the five-year US Treasury bond, 
since they are nominal and have the same coupon structure. In this case we use a six-month window, 
since we have less data. Correlation in this case is significant for most of the sample, suggesting the 
existence of financial integration. 
Given the conflicting evidence obtained above, we decided to conduct an alternative test of financial 
integration, using the interest rate parity equation. This relation states that the difference between 
internal and external interest rates is equal to the expected appreciation or depreciation of the local 
currency. However, empirical tests of uncovered interest rate parity usually fail. Given this fact, we 
focus on the correlation between the interest rate differential and the expected currency appreciation/ 
depreciation. 
The interest rate parity equation is: 
it – spreadt – it* = E(et+1 – et), 
where E is the expectations operator. To generate the expected appreciation/depreciation series we 
use the monthly Survey of Expectations of the Central Bank of Chile. This survey has existed since 
December 2000. It asks for the future value of the US dollar, from which we calculate expected 
changes in the exchange rate over a 12-month horizon. 
To compute the interest rate differential, we used a five-year US Treasury bond interest rate as the 
external rate. For the internal interest rate we used two alternatives. First, we used the real eight-year 
CBCh coupon bond (PRC-8) rate, adding an estimate for expected inflation. The latter was assumed 
to be 3% between December 2000 and September 2002. From this date onwards, we computed 
expected inflation as the difference between the nominal (BCP-5) and real (BCU-5) yields on five-year 
CBCh bonds. A second method was to make direct use of the BCP-5 nominal bond, which has existed 
only since September 2002. The two methods give very similar results. Graph 8 shows the evolution of 
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Graph 8 
Expected depreciation and interest rate differential 
Six- and 12-month correlation coefficient 
 
The correlation between the interest differential and expected depreciation was calculated using 
windows of six and 12 months of monthly data. Graph 8 suggests that this correlation has increased 
over time, growing towards one, especially after December 2001. A factor that may help explain this 
higher correlation is the issuance of new bonds by the CBCh since September 2002. These bonds are 
closer in format to international standards and may facilitate comparison, and therefore arbitrage. 
IV.2 Financial integration and institutions 
In this section we study how financial integration affected the capacity of local firms to access foreign 
sources of capital. We centre the analysis on whether foreign control has an impact on the ability to 
tap foreign capital markets in the case of banks and firms. 
IV.2.1 Banking  sector 
In the last 10 years foreign control of the banking system has more than doubled in terms of assets, 
increasing from 16% in the mid-1990s to 43% today. However, the increase in foreign ownership in a 
period of higher financial integration does not seem to make a difference in terms of access to foreign 
funding. The latter seems to be driven mainly by market conditions, and locally and foreign-controlled 
banks exhibit a similar pattern, as shown in Graph 9. 
Graph 9 
Foreign debt as a percentage 
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IV.2.2 Firms 
We analysed a sample of the largest 100 companies that report to the Superintendency of Securities 
and Insurance, which represent 84% of the assets of all reporting firms. Any firm that issues publicly 
traded instruments, either equity or bonds, has to report to this regulatory body. State-owned 
companies were not considered in the sample. Foreigners control 48% of assets, with the remainder in 
control of nationals. Our main findings are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 





Debt with foreign banks  12.9%  2.4%  7.4% 
Bonds issued abroad  11.4%  2.0%  6.5% 
Debt  with  local  banks  3.2% 3.9% 3.6% 
Bonds issued locally  10.5%  7.0%  8.7% 
Total  debt  38.0% 15.3% 26.0% 
Source: Calculations based on SVS balance sheet data. 
 
Table 2 shows two facts: (i) foreign-controlled firms use more debt than locally controlled firms to 
finance their assets, and (ii) foreign firms make more extensive use of foreign markets for funding. 
Even after controlling for higher debt use, foreign firms obtain 64% of their funding abroad, while 
foreign debt amounts to only 29% in the case of local firms. This might be a manifestation of the 
“home bias” described by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), who interpret their results as an indication of 
incomplete financial integration. 
One argument against this finding is that foreign investment is concentrated in sectors that use debt 
more intensively. Inspection of the sectoral composition of the data renders this argument invalid. 
Excluding public infrastructure concessionaires, which include only foreign-controlled firms, we 
observe in Table 3 that the bias towards foreign funding of foreign-controlled firms actually increases 










Debt with foreign banks  12.9%  2.4%  7.2% 
Bonds issued abroad  10.2%  2.0%  6.2% 
Debt  with  local  banks  2.1% 3.9% 3.2% 
Bonds issued locally  7.7%  7.0%  7.8% 
Total  debt  33.0% 15.3% 24.4% 
Source: Calculations based on SVS balance sheet data. 
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We next refined our analysis by excluding Spanish-controlled power generation and distribution 
companies, which represent 19% of total assets in our sample, as these companies make extensive 
use of debt and obtain a significant part of it abroad. Table 4 shows that the overall leverage of 
foreign-controlled firms decreases significantly, but is still 70% higher than that of local firms. External 
funding by foreign-controlled firms drops to 52% of assets, but is still much higher than the 29% figure 
observed in locally controlled firms. 
 
Table 4 
Debt as a percentage of assets 





Debt with foreign banks  8.9%  2.4%  4.7% 
Bonds issued abroad  4.9%  2.0%  4.2% 
Debt  with  local  banks  3.1% 3.9% 4.4% 
Bonds issued locally  9.5%  7.0%  10.1% 
Total  debt  26.5% 15.3% 23.3% 
Source: Calculations based on SVS balance sheet data. 
 
In sum, we conclude that foreign ownership does make a difference in the case of firms. Foreign-
controlled firms exhibit significantly higher leverage than locally controlled firms. Moreover, foreign-
controlled firms tend to use external sources of funding more intensively than locally controlled firms in 
all sectors of the economy. This result was robust to various adjustments to control for sector-specific 
characteristics. 
V. Concluding  remarks 
Thirty years after its first capital account liberalisation, Chile is today fully integrated into world financial 
markets. But before reaching this stage, the country paid significant costs and learned important 
lessons. The most important is that financial integration has many benefits, but also entails risks. In 
order to deal with these risks, solid fundamentals and strong institutions are required. The institutional 
cornerstones of Chile’s current macroeconomic stability include a monetary policy based on inflation 
targeting, a fiscal policy based on a structural budget surplus rule, and a floating exchange rate 
regime, all complemented by strong but evolving financial sector regulation and supervision. 
This policy and institutional framework has reduced the potential costs derived from internal factors, 
such as policy inconsistencies, one-way bets, implicit insurance or moral hazard. At the same time, it 
cushions the effects of volatile capital flows, as adjustments are made to a larger extent through prices 
rather than quantities, with agents internalising inherent risks. 
Today Chile is enjoying the benefits of international financial integration with reasonable assurances 
against the risks associated with free and volatile capital flows. To be sure, many challenges remain, 
among them ongoing fine-tuning of the monetary policy framework, consolidation of the fiscal policy 
framework, modernisation of the financial sector, and expansion of the benefits of financial integration. 
Our empirical analysis suggests that the Chilean economy has been highly integrated at the level of 
stock markets since 1992, and that stock market volatility declined with financial integration. Financial 
integration is not present at the level of short-term fixed income instruments, which is a sign of 
monetary independence. But there are increasing signs of financial integration in the behaviour of 
long-term bond rates after 2001. We also found that foreign ownership does not seem to make a 
difference in terms of access to foreign funding in the Chilean banking sector. But foreign ownership 
does make a difference in the case of firms. Foreign-controlled firms exhibit higher leverage ratios and BIS Papers No 23  123
 
use external sources of funds more intensively than locally controlled firms. This may be a sign of 
incomplete financial integration at the firm level. 
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